During the 2022–2023 school year, the Montgomery County Board of Education (Board) introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts into the public school curriculum. Those texts included five “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks approved for students in kindergarten through fifth grade, which have story lines focused on sexuality and gender. When parents in Montgomery County sought to have their children excused from instruction involving those books, the Board initially compromised with the parents by notifying them when the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would be taught and permitting their children to be excused from the instruction. That compromise was consistent with the Board’s “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity,” which professed a commitment to making “reasonable accommodations” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of students. Less than a year after the Board introduced the books, however, it rescinded the parental opt out policy. Among other things, the Board said that it “could not accommodate the growing number of opt out requests without causing significant disruptions to the classroom environment.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 607a.
The petitioners here are a group of individual parents and an unincorporated association of other interested parties. The individual parents come from diverse religious backgrounds and hold sincere views on sexuality and gender which they wish to pass on to their children. Faced with the Board’s decision to rescind opt outs, petitioners filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Among other things, they asserted that the Board’s no-opt-out policy infringed on parents’ right to the free exercise of their religion. See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 524. They relied heavily on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, in which the Court recognized that parents have a right “to direct the religious upbringing of their children” and that this right can be infringed by laws that pose “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices that parents wish to instill in their children. Id., at 218, 233. Petitioners sought a preliminary and permanent injunction “prohibiting the School Board from forcing [their] children and other students—over the objection of their parents—to read, listen to, or discuss” the storybooks. App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. The District Court denied relief, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Parents challenging the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction. Pp. 16–41.
(a) The parents assert that the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—combined with its decision to withhold notice and opt outs—unconstitutionally burdens their religious exercise. At this stage, the parents seek a preliminary injunction that would permit them to have their children excused from instruction related to the storybooks while this lawsuit proceeds. To obtain that form of preliminary relief, the parents must show that: they are likely to succeed on the merits; they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; the balance of equities tips in their favor; and an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20. The parents have made such a showing. Pp. 16–17.
(b) The parents are likely to succeed on their claim that the Board’s policies unconstitutionally burden their religious exercise. The Court has “long recognized the rights of parents to direct ‘the religious upbringing’ of their children.” Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. 464, 486 (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214). Those rights are violated by government policies that “substantially interfer[e] with the religious development” of children. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. Pp. 17–27.
(1) For many people of faith, there are few religious acts more important than the religious education of their children. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 754. And the practice of educating one’s children in one’s religious beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a generous measure of constitutional protection. The Constitution protects, for example, a parent’s decision to send his or her child to a private religious school instead of a public school. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 532–535. And the Court has recognized limits on the government’s ability to interfere with a student’s religious upbringing in a public school setting. In West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, for example, the Court held that a policy requiring public school students to salute the flag could not be enforced against Jehovah’s Witnesses—who consider the flag a “graven image”—consistent with the First Amendment.
Barnette involved an egregious kind of direct coercion: a requirement that students make an affirmation contrary to their parents’ religious beliefs. In Yoder, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause also protects against policies that impose more subtle forms of interference with the religious upbringing of children. There, the Court considered a compulsory-education law that would place Amish children into “an environment hostile to Amish beliefs,” where they would face “pressure to conform” to contrary viewpoints and lifestyles. 406 U. S., at 211. The Court concluded that such a law “substantially interfer[ed] with the religious development of the Amish child” and therefore “carrie[d] with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id., at 218. Pp. 18–21.
(2) The Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, combined with its decision to withhold notice to parents and to forbid opt outs, substantially interferes with the religious development of petitioners’ children and imposes the kind of burden on religious exercise that Yoder found unacceptable. The books are unmistakably normative. They are designed to present certain values and beliefs as things to be celebrated, and certain contrary values and beliefs as things to be rejected.
Take, for example, the message sent by the books concerning same-sex marriage. Many Americans “advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 679. That group includes each of the parents in this case. The storybooks, however, are designed to present the opposite viewpoint to young, impressionable children who are likely to accept without question any moral messages conveyed by their teacher’s instruction. The storybooks present same-sex weddings as occasions for great celebration and suggest that the only rubric for determining whether a marriage is acceptable is whether the individuals concerned “love each other.”
The storybooks similarly convey a normative message on the subjects of sex and gender. Many Americans, like the parents in this case, believe that biological sex reflects divine creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and that children should be encouraged to accept their sex and to live accordingly. The storybooks, however, suggest that it is hurtful, and perhaps even hateful, to hold the view that gender is inextricably bound with biological sex.
Like the compulsory high school education considered in Yoder, these books impose upon children a set of values and beliefs that are “hostile” to their parents’ religious beliefs. Id., at 211. And the books exert upon children a psychological “pressure to conform” to their specific viewpoints. Ibid. The books therefore present the same kind of “objective danger to the free exercise of religion” that the Court identified in Yoder. Id., at 218. Pp. 21–27.
(c) None of the counterarguments raised by the Board, the courts below, or the Board’s amici give us any reason to doubt the existence of a burden on religious exercise here. Pp. 27–35.
(1) The Court does not accept the Board’s characterizations of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction as mere “exposure to objectionable ideas” or as lessons in “mutual respect.” The storybooks unmistakably convey a particular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender. And the Board has specifically encouraged teachers to reinforce this viewpoint and to reprimand any children who disagree. That goes beyond mere “exposure.” Regardless, the question in cases of this kind is whether the educational requirement or curriculum at issue would “substantially interfer[e] with the religious development” of the child, or pose “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices the parent wishes to instill in the child. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. Whether or not a requirement or curriculum could be characterized as “exposure” is not the touchstone for determining whether that line is crossed. Pp. 27–28.
(2) The Board’s reliance on the Court’s decisions in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, is likewise unpersuasive. In those cases, the Court held that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens,” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 699, even when the conduct of such internal affairs might result in “incidental interference with an individual’s spiritual activities,” Lyng, 485 U. S., at 450. That principle has no application here. The government’s operation of public schools is not a matter of “internal affairs” akin to the administration of Social Security or the selection of “filing cabinets.” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 700. It implicates direct, coercive interactions between the State and its young residents. Pp. 28–29.
(3) The courts below erred by dismissing this Court’s decision in Yoder. The Court has never confined Yoder to its facts, and there is no reason to conclude that the decision is “sui generis” or “tailored to [its] specific evidence,” as the courts below reasoned. While the Court noted in Yoder that the Amish made a showing “that probably few other religious groups or sects could make,” that language must be read in the context of the specific claims raised by the Amish respondents, i.e., the right to withdraw their children from all conventional schooling after a certain age. 406 U. S., at 235–236. Contrary to the suggestions of the courts below, Yoder embodies a robust principle of general applicability. Pp. 29–31.
(4) The Fourth Circuit’s view that the record in this case is too “threadbare” to demonstrate a burden on religious exercise is also unconvincing. 102 F. 4th 191, 209. That court faulted the parents for failing to make specific allegations describing how the books “are actually being used in classrooms.” Id., at 213. But when a deprivation of First Amendment rights is at stake, a plaintiff need not wait for the damage to occur before filing suit. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158. To evaluate the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court need only decide whether—if teachers act according to the clear and undisputed instructions of the Board—a burden on religious exercise will occur. Pp. 31–32.
(5) It is no answer that parents remain free to place their children in private school or to educate them at home. Public education is a public benefit, and the government cannot “condition” its “availability” on parents’ willingness to accept a burden on their religious exercise. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 462. Moreover, given that education is compulsory in Maryland, the parents are not being asked simply to forgo a public benefit. They have an obligation—enforceable by fine or imprisonment—to send their children to public school unless they find an adequate substitute they can afford. §§7–301(a)(3), (e).
Nor is it of any comfort to suggest that parents can educate their children at home after school. The parents in Barnette and Yoder were similarly capable of teaching their religious values “at home,” but that made no difference in the First Amendment analysis in those cases. It is similarly unconvincing to suggest that the parents could have challenged the educational requirements via the democratic process. The parents tried and failed to obtain legislative change, and had every right to resort to judicial review to protect their rights. Pp. 32–35.
(d) Having concluded that the Board’s policy burdens the parents’ right to the free exercise of religion, the Court turns to the question whether that burden is constitutionally permitted. Pp. 35–40.
(1) In most circumstances, the government is generally free to place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it does so pursuant to a neutral policy that is generally applicable. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878–879. But when a law imposes a burden of the same character as that in Yoder, as does the challenged Board policy here, strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of whether the law is neutral or generally applicable. Smith, 494 U. S., at 881. Pp. 35–37.
(2) To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that its policy “advances ‘interests of the highest order’ and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.” Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546). The Board asserts that its curriculum and no-opt-out policy serve its compelling interest in maintaining a school environment that is safe and conducive to learning for all students. As a general matter, schools have a “compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students’ learning.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 119. But the Board’s conduct in continuing to permit opt outs in a variety of other circumstances undermines its assertion that its no-opt-out policy is necessary to serve that interest. Pp. 37–40.
(e) Without an injunction, the parents will continue to suffer an unconstitutional burden on their religious exercise, and such a burden unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14, 19 (per curiam). And an injunction here would be both equitable and in the public interest. Thus, the petitioners have shown that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction. Specifically, until all appellate review in this case is completed, the Board should be ordered to notify the petitioners in advance whenever one of the books in question or any other similar book is to be used in any way and to allow them to have their children excused from that instruction. Pp. 40–41.
102 F. 4th 191, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined.
References are in the order they appear in the syllabus/opinion/dissent, but organized by link destination.
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