The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO) directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. §1228(b)(3), aliens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration officer that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Jamaica. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which prohibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley’s case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be removed to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ’s order and allowed the FARO’s enforcement. Three days later, Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1) aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” proceedings by filing within 30 days of that decision, and (2) §1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims-processing rule.

Held:

1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” proceedings are not “final order[s] of removal” under §1252(b)(1).

An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat. 3009–627, which, in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” §1101(a)(47)(A). The FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is “the final order of removal” under the statute because it held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from the United States. The order was also the Executive’s final determination on the question of removal. An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review of the order. §1101(a)(47)(B). Because an alien in streamlined removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or the BIA, the period to seek review “expire[s]” as soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that the order becomes final immediately upon issuance.

The Court’s decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, buttress this conclusion. In Nasrallah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not final removal orders because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order deportation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not “disturb” or “affect the validity” of final removal orders, so they do not merge into final orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a final removal order will merge into the final order for purposes of judicial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings. The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become “administratively final” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings, and “the finality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533, 539–540.

The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was whether the removal order in that case was “administratively final” for purposes of detention, not whether a removal order constitutes “the final order of removal” for purposes of filing. But this argument conflates when a petition for review must be filed with the issues that may be adjudicated in that proceeding. The Government then compares the purposes of finality in §§1252(b)(1) and 1231, arguing that the meaning differs. Although finality may serve different purposes under different statutes, it does not follow that the meaning of finality necessarily varies. The Government raises legitimate practical concerns about removal orders becoming final before withholding-only relief is decided, but the Court must follow statutory text and precedent. The text and precedents make clear that the FARO is the final order of removal, and withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the finality of otherwise final removal orders. Pp. 5–11.

2. The 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

Categorizing a rule as jurisdictional has important consequences that may disrupt the orderly and efficient adjudication of cases in the federal courts. Court precedent shows reluctance to label rules “jurisdictional” unless Congress clearly signals that intent. While Congress need not use “magic words” to indicate that a rule is jurisdictional, Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 436, the Court’s recent decisions require an exceedingly strong signal for jurisdictional classification. That demanding requirement is not met here.

Section 1252(b)(1) states petitions “must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” This language tells aliens what to do to obtain judicial review, but it provides no directives to courts. It does not reference jurisdiction and lacks any language “demarcat[ing] a court’s power.” Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U. S. 480, 484. The placement of the statute also suggests it is not jurisdictional because neither the particular subsection nor the broader section in which the deadline is placed concerns jurisdiction.

Precedents extending back nearly 20 years support classifying §1252(b)(1)’s deadline as a claims-processing rule. Before Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, the Court occasionally classified “nonextendable time limit[s]” as jurisdictional. Id., at 510 (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229). In Arbaugh, however, the Court made clear that courts should only treat statutory limitations as jurisdictional if Congress “clearly states” that they have jurisdictional consequences. Id., at 515. The Court’s cases since Arbaugh have almost uniformly found that the provisions at issue fail this demanding test. The one exception is John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138, where the Court would not overturn a “definitive earlier interpretation” of a statute as jurisdictional without clear congressional directive. There, century-old decisions held that the provision was truly jurisdictional. Id., at 134–135.

While Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 405, characterized §1252(b)(1)’s predecessor provision as “jurisdictional,” it used the term loosely and did not “atten[d] to the distinction between ‘jurisdictional’ rules (as we understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but mandatory ones.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411, 421. Since Stone, the Court has repeatedly found that filing deadlines, including mandatory ones, are not jurisdictional.

Section 1252’s 30-day filing rule is not jurisdictional, but because the Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal the Court’s holding does not preclude this case from proceeding on remand. Pp. 11–16.

Vacated and remanded.

Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined in full, and in which Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson, JJ., joined only as to Part II–B. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined in full, and in which Gorsuch, J., joined except as to Part IV.