Justice Kagan, dissenting.

For all the reasons Justice Sotomayor gives, Tennessee’s SB1 warrants heightened judicial scrutiny. See ante, at 9–27 (dissenting opinion). That means the law survives if, but only if, its sex-based classifications are “substantially related to the achievement” of “important governmental objectives.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 533 (1996). As Justice Sotomayor notes, the point of applying that test is to smoke out “invidious” or otherwise unfounded discrimination. Ante, at 10; Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty., 450 U. S. 464, 469 (1981) (plurality opinion). More concretely put, heightened scrutiny reveals whether a law is based on “overbroad generalizations,” stereotypes, or prejudices, or is instead based on legitimate state interests, such as the one here asserted in protecting minors’ health. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533. Because the Court is wrong in not subjecting SB1 to that kind of examination, I join Parts through IV of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent.

I take no view on how SB1 would fare under heightened scrutiny, and therefore do not join Part V. The record evidence here is extensive, complex, and disputed, and the Court of Appeals (because it applied only rational-basis review) never addressed the relevant issues. Still more, both the plaintiffs and the Government asked this Court not to itself apply heightened scrutiny, but only to remand that inquiry to the lower courts. So I would both start and stop at the question of what test SB1 must satisfy. As Justice Sotomayor shows, it is heightened scrutiny. I respectfully dissent.